Spatiotemporal chaos of a two-dimensional one-way coupled map lattice is used for chaotic cryptography. The chaotic outputs of many space units are used for encryption simultaneously. This system shows satisfactory cryptographic properties of high security; fast encryption (decryption) speed; and robustness against noise disturbances in communication channel. The overall features of this spatiotemporal chaos based cryptosystem are better than chaotic cryptosystems known so far, and also than currently used conventional cryptosystems, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). PACS number(s): 05.45. Vx, 05.45.Ra, 43.72.+q Typeset using REVT E X 1
sequences generated by different sites to encode (decode) plaintexts simultaneously [4] , and thus the efficiency of cryptography can be greatly enhanced. Moreover, we can choose proper coupling structure and encryption transformation and separate the functions of driving bits and pure cipher bits for reaching high security together with satisfactory robustness against channel noise. The overall properties of our cryptosystem can be thus incomparably better than the chaotic cryptosystems known so far, and be also considerably better than the most effective conventional cryptographic methods, like AES.
We use the following chaotic coupled map lattice for transmitter encryption, 
where I n 's are the plaintexts assumed to be private, S n (j 1 , j 2 ) are the ciphertexts transmitted in the open channel, and a = (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m ) are the adjustable control parameters, serving as the secret key. For specific we will, throughout the paper, take parameters h = 26, µ = 52, ν = 32, ε = 0.99, m = 3, N = 6, and a 1 = a 2 = a 3 = 3.9.
The schematic encoding structure is given in Fig.1 . First, we use a 1D lattice chain of length m = 3, for setting the secret keys a = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) in Eq.(1a). This arrangement can guarantee full sensitivity of the encryption processes to all key parameters on one hand, and reduce as much as possible the number of noncipher sites on the other hand. Second, following the 1D chain is a 2D one-way coupled map lattice of Eqs. considerably enhance the sensitivity of chaos synchronization to the key parameter variations, and thus reach high practical encryption security [14] . Finally, from the M outputs sequences S n (j 1 , j 2 ), a single arbitrarily chosen sequence [S n (3, 3) in Fig.1 ] is separated from the remaining cipher sequences as the driving sequences in Eq.(1a) and Fig.1 , and this separation will be shown later of great significance in strengthening the robustness of the system against channel noise. With the feed back of the driving in Eq.(1a) the encoding system turns to be high-dimensional nonautonomous spatiotemporal chaos.
The decryption transformation of the receiver can be obtained symmetrically by replacing
, and the test key b = (b 1 , b 2 , ..., b m ), respectively. Only one among the M = 25 transmitted signals,
ν , serves as the driving signal for the spatiotemporal chaos synchronization of the receiver; and decoding operations become
n are the received plaintexts. By setting b = a, the receiver can realize synchronization to the chaotic transmitter, and correctly extract the message as
Now, let us evaluate our cryptosystem in the aspects of performance, security and robustness. The first significant point of Eqs. (1) and Eq. (2) 3) ) between two neighbor keystreams K n (2, 4) and
, with H(K n (2, 4)) and H(K n (2, 4) | K n (2, 3)) being information entropy and conditional entropy, respectively. The behaviors of Fig.2 are not changed if we take any other pais of sites. Thus, all the keystreams produced by different sites are practically independent from each other, and can be satisfactorily used for the parallel encryption (decryption)
purpose.
Second, we evaluate the practical security of the cryptosystem, i.e., the resistance of the chaotic system against the plaintext-known and public-structure attacks, by applying the error function analysis (EFA) [13] . The error function e(b) can be computed with the available information and an arbitrary test key b as
By varying b any third party may find the basin of e and from the numerous local minima of e(b) in Fig.3 (c) one can hardly find any adaptive approach to reveal the e(b) basin more effective than random tests, and the third party has to make at least 10 35 tests to find the key basin. This can be done by the currently best computer in the world at least for 10 16 years (the estimation can be seen in [13] ).
Apart from the EFA method, there are many other known attack methods in both conventional and chaotic cryptographies, such as linear and differential attacks [15] , nonlinear dynamic forecasting attacks [9, 10] , and so on. All these methods are based on predicting plaintexts by revealing the plaintext-induced statistical changes of ciphertexts. We have computed probability distributions of the ciphertexts generated at different sites for various plaintexts. It is clearly observed that for essentially different plaintexts the probabilities of ciphertexts have the same uniform distributions, and they are not distinguishable from each other. Therefore, the above attacks can be hardly practical. Analytic inverse computation can also break the security of Eq.(1). A simple evaluation shows that for our system this inverse computation requires cost much more than the EFA method.
Our cryptosystem is better than AES with security in the following two aspects. First, with secure key well hidden our system is practically one-time pad cipher, while AES is definitely not either with hidden key. Second, our system can easily increase its security level, e.g., increasing m by one we can increase the security factor by 10 12 with almost no encryption speed reduction. For AES there exists a maximum security level (2 128 for given plaintext attack). For further increasing security from this maximum level one has to increase the block length, and then considerably decrease the encryption speed. Therefore, our system can much easier in resistance against stronger attacks developed by new powerful computers, like possible quantum computers.
The last point to be emphasized is that the cryptographic structure of Eq.(1) makes the secure communication robust against channel noise disturbances. All self-synchronizing cryptosystems have a disadvantage of error avalanche, i.e., one bit error in ciphertext may cause a large number of error bits in the received plaintext due to the finite synchronization recovering time, and slower synchronization may cause more serious avalanche effect. In this regard, our system has several useful advantages. First, our decoding system takes a strong coupling (1−ε) = 10 −2 << 1 which yields rather small largest Lyapunov exponent, leading to quickly damping of any desynchronous disturbances in the receiver. This guarantees short synchronization time (26 iterations for our parameter combination) and relatively small error avalanche (17 iterations). Second, chaos synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver can be realized by using a single driving sequence. Thus, among all M = 25 transmitted ciphertext sequences, only one sequence is used for driving, i.e., only Therefore, in average the avalanche destruction can be considerably reduced. Third and the most important, in order to reduce error avalanche people commonly include some additional bits for protection of driving signal, that increases the costs of both cryptography and signal transmission. In doing so our system has a great advantage of low cost over AES because in the latter case one should protect all transmitted bits (each has equal avalanche effect)
while for the former only the driving signal, i.e., 1 M of the total transmitted bits, has the avalanche effect and needs to be particularly protected.
The cryptosystem of Eqs. (1) and (2) with the given parameters has been realized in a software experiment for duplex voice transmission by using local university campus network.
The experimental set is given by Fig.2 of [13] with cryptosystem replaced by Eqs. (1) and (2) of this paper. Experimental dialogue can be performed stably between two phones with standard voice quality and standard speaking speed for arbitrarily long time. Moreover, we have realized also experimental duplex voice transmission by using normal city phone line where channel noise is considerably larger than that of network. In this experiment our system works perfectly well with high security ( high sensitivity to the key parameter change) and satisfactory robustness against noise. A detailed discussion on this experimental set and a detailed experimental comparison between our system and AES will be reported soon. 
